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During Sentence Comprehension
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1. Fixed Expressions -- Issues of Representation and Processing
Understanding language involves recognition and access to not only indi-
vidual words, but also to a vast array of fixed expressions-idioms, collo-
cations, proverbs, common quotations, names, titles, slogans, song lyrics,
etc.   The purpose of the present paper is to examine the question of how
fixed expressions-particularly those with non-literal interpretations-are
understood during on-line sentence comprehension. The work we present
examines cases of both truly fixed expressions and those which are deemed
somewhat more malleable but still 'idiomatic', with a focus on the process-
ing of these expressions in a language that has a highly productive (active)
use of word collocation, particularly for compounds-German.  We begin
by outlining some general assumptions and issues underlying our work.
To begin with, there is no clear ground upon which to firmly establish
definitions of what constitutes a purely 'literal' vs. 'figurative' (non-literal)
expression.  Such definition ultimately awaits a monolithic (universal and
correct) theory of semantics/syntax.   Similarly, distinguishing what ate
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truly fixed expressions vs. expressions with some productive features vs.
expressions that are highly productive and malleable is equally problematic,
and awaits a universally descriptive theory of language. However, the cases
we deal with in the research presented below do not fall on the grey areas of
any such descriptive generalizations-we use cases for which there will be
wide agreement (backed by empirical data) as to the degree of non-literal
and fixedness of interpretation, and we take such clear cases to be important
end points in developing a processing theory of figurative expressions.
Thus, while we acknowledge the ongoing tension between approaches that
hold that 'literal' and 'metaphoric/figurative' processes are different process-
ing types vs. simply different endpoints on a single continuum of process-
ing, (see, e.g., Clark 1978; Gibbs 1984; Lehrer 1974; Newmeyer 1972;
Weinreich 1967 for variations on such approaches) the work we present is
intended to be independent of either viewpoint (although it -is designed to
illuminate the debate).
Similarly,   while   much  literature  has   debated   the   degree  of
(de)compositionality (or, 'frozenness') inherent in idioms (see, e.g., Frase,
1974; Gibbs and Nayak 1989; Heringer 1976), we accept the problem of
heterogeneity among 'non-literal' expressions with regard to current linguis-
tic compositional theory-our approach is independent of (but, again, may
shed light on) the resolution of such issues.
One traditional way in which non-literal (figurative) expressions have
been treated is as merely one of a heterogeneous bundle of pragmatic phe-
nomenon that are stored and computed outside of 'standard language proc-
essing' per se (see, e.g., Katz & Fodor 1963). This view of metaphoric
processing has been extended by some theoreticians to include figurative
expressions that have become fixed forms (idioms) in the language. Other
approaches have assumed such fixed-form expressions to have a representa-
tion all their own (whether as part of the language system or not; e.g., Bo-
brow & Bell 1973). Still other approaches have assumed that fixed-form
expressions, whether literal or figurative in interpretation, are simply lexical
entries precisely like those assumed for standard literal interpretation of
individual words (see, e.g., Di Sciullo & Williams 1987; Swinney & Cut-
ler 1979). Our work is designed to examine certain aspects of this issue.
Finally, in its simplest description, a fixed figurative expression (for
simplicity, the term "idiom" will be used hereafter to refer to such an ex-
pression) is a string of, words for which the interpretation is not (entirely)
derived from the individual meanings of the words comprising the string
(even if there can be seen some historical linkage of the literal words to the
overall expression). Further, this non-literal interpretation has become
'fixed' in the language by use. Thus, the idiom "trip the light fantastic"
(meaning, roughly, "to dance") has little relationship to the current individ-
ual meanings of the words in that phrase. The work we present in this pa-
per concerns word compounds that have idiomatic meaning. The work will
be focused on idiomatic compounds in German, a language that, in contrast
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to English, has a highly productive use of compounding in natural lan-
guage. Thus, the study of these forms in German provides a strong labora-
tory for examining the operation of a processing device that must deal with
both highly literal and highly non-literal compounding of words on a regu-
lar basis. We note here that, as in all idioms, an idiom compound's mean-
ing may be: a) entirely independent from the `literal' meanings of the indi-
vidual words in the compound, or b) partially related to one of the `literal'
meanings of the compound via either structural or semantic analysis, or c)
entirely ambiguous-having both a 'literal' and a 'figurative` meaning.
Consider, for example, the English compound "redhead". This has the
structurally decomposable literal meaning involving a head that is red in
color (perhaps from sunburn or dye), the partially decomposable meaning of
"having hair that is red", and the non-decomposable figurative meaning of
"hot tempered"-a meaning derivable only by `knowledge' of personality
features stereotypically associated with persons who have red hair. The latter
meaning has come to be 'fixed' by use-and is thus idiomatic. Consider
also the English compound "horse-laugh". With the exception of the small
class of individuals who deal closely with horses (and who might attribute
the human descriptor of laughter to a horse) there is no literal
(decomposable or otherwise) interpretation of this compound. Yet the fixed
idiom is easily understood to mean a loud annoying (braying) laugh by a
human. Overall, we are not primarily concerned here with the compositional
origins of a metaphoric derivation of these fixed forms, but we note that it
is clear that no single concept of (de)composition will easily work in de-
scribing interpretation for such a variety of forms (see, e.g., Lehnert 1986).
Relatedly, we want to note that neither representation nor processing of
putatively compositional lexical concepts necessarily induces more compu-
tational costs than non-decompositional ones (see, e.g., Fodor, Fodor, &
Garrett 1975; Fodor, Garrett, Walker, & Parkes 1980), and thus measures of
processing load, per se, will not be sufficient to differentiate processing
models concerning such entities. It will, rather, take direct evidence about
the activation (or lack thereof) of various non-literal and literal meanings of
individual (and joint) elements in the compounds-and the time-course of
their activations-to distinguish among such models. The present work is
focused on providing an analysis of the computational processes involved
In the interpretation of fixed compound expressions during sentence proc-
essing, using on-line measures that are sensitive to the temporal constraints
of sentence processing, and which reveal activation of individual words and
concepts during such processing.
2.   Idiom Processing Accounts
There are two broadly differing accounts of idiom processing, accounts that
might best be distinguished as 'literal-meaning-dependent' vs. 'literal-
meaning-independent' models. The former all hold that access to idiomatic
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the items comprising the idiom. In some approaches, this takes the form of
a claim that the perceiver accesses first the literal meaning(s) of the words
the idiom is composed of before s/he accesses the non-literal (idiomatic)
meaning (e.g., Clark & Lucy 1975; Fraser 1970; Weinreich 1967). In a
related approach, it is assumed that there is a separate 'idiom list' (perhaps
outside of the lexicon) which will be accessed when the processing of a
literal interpretation fails (e.g., Bobrow & Bell 1973). All approaches
within this model essentially assert a form of two-stage serial ac-
cess/processing in which the idiomatic interpretation is achieved only in the
second stage. In some cases this two-stage processes is viewed as cascaded
(somewhat temporally overlapping), but in all such models, some temporal
distinctions between initial literal analysis and later idiomatic analysis all
hold. In this approach, idioms are treated much as non-fixed figurative
language forms would be.
There are also several types of literal-meaning-independent hypotheses
about idiom processing that have been proposed. The lexical representation
hypothesis (LRH) holds that idiomatic and literal meanings of words and
word compounds are simultaneously activated upon encountering the idiom
(see, e.g., Swinney & Cutler 1979). In this, idioms are simply large (multi-
segment) words stored in the lexicon much as meaning is stored for any
word. Given that the lexical ambiguity literature provides strong evidence
that all meanings associated with a word are accessed upon encountering the
'form' of the word (e.g., Ahrens 1998; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman and
Bienkowski 1982; Swinney 1979; among others), the idiom meaning is
accessed along with the other meanings of words-based on complete iden-
tification of the form of the word.
In a somewhat different but related view, the "direct access hypothesis"
holds that linguistic analysis can be completely bypassed if the perceiver
i mmediately recognizes the relevant expression as an idiom (Gibbs 1980;
1984; 1986). This approach does not specify whether this is considered to
be lexical access or not, and it has variants in which semantic and syntactic
aspects of idiom use can be considered in the access process. The latter are
"idiom decomposition approaches" in which a perceiver analyzes
decomposable idioms by accessing first the figurative meaning of parts of
the idioms. For example, in interpreting the idiom "pop the question" the
perceiver would access the figurative meanings of "pop" (suddenly utter)
and "the question" (marriage proposal) and interpret the entire idiom from
these (e.g., Gibbs, Nayak, & Cutting 1989).
Overall, both off-line as well as on-line processing evidence has tended
to support the literal-meaning-independent accounts over the literal-
meaning-dependent approaches, largely via evidence that access to the id-
iomatic meaning takes either about the same time as (or is even faster than)
access to the literal counterpart of the expression (e.g., Gibbs 1980; 1986;
Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds & Antos 1978; Swinney & Cutler 1979).
(Note, this is a considerably different model than the evidence about non-
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idiomatic figurative language processing supports-but that is not the issue
of relevance here.) Clearly, such evidence is highly dependent on a clear
understanding of the experimental methods applied to studies of idiom
processing, and we examine such concerns below. However, overall, there
is considerable evidence that idiomatic meanings are not made available any
less rapidly than literal interpretations of these words, a fact that can only
be taken as support for the literal-meaning-independent models.
For example, Gibbs et al. (1989) have examined processing for three
types of idioms (normal, abnormally decomposable idioms and non-
decomposable idioms) in a reaction time study. The example "pop the
question" is considered to be a normal decomposable idiom as each part
contributes to the overall meaning of the idiom; in contrast, "to carry a
torch" would be an abnormal decomposable idiom because only one part
("torch") would express a figurative relationship ("warm feelings"); and,
independent  from  etymological  considerations,   the  parts  of   non- 
decomposable idioms appear not to contribute the idiomatic meaning di-
rectly at all (e.g., "to chew the fat"). Exemplars of these idiom types were
presented visually to subjects who were asked to verify (acceptable/ unac-
ceptable judgments) such phrases, along with their literal counterparts (e.g.,
"ask the question", "light the torch"). It was found that decomposable
(normal and abnormal) idioms were verified faster than their literal counter-
parts, thus leading the authors to support a literal-meaning-independent
model in which idioms do not need to be analyzed into their literal read-
ings. In this study, it was found that the non-decomposable idioms were
verified significantly slower than their literal control phrases. This and
similar findings have often been argued to demonstrate that subjects would
perform a compositional analysis on the idiomatic word strings to deter-
mine their figurative meaning, and their attempt (and inability) to do so
causes slower processing. However, such an interpretation of these interest-
i ng results may not have sufficiently considered critical methodological
aspects of the task used. For example, the idiomatic phrases that are used in
these studies are presented in isolation, out of sentential context. After see-
ing a large number of items which are compositional (two-thirds of the ex-
perimental materials and all of the matched controls) and being required to
make a conscious decision about each of them, it appears highly likely that
subjects will tend toward a conscious `compositional analysis' mode of
evaluating these short phrases. Such conscious processing, however, is
most likely to take place only subsequent to actual unconscious comprehen-
sion of the phrases. Thus, it may simply be that finding something un-
usual (e.g., the few non-decomposable items) in this list causes the con-
scious processing and analysis of these expressions to `hiccup' (so to
speak), and make for longer conscious decisions. In general, isolated phrase
verification techniques of this type can lead to many specialized strategies
that are not used in normal language understanding, a point which leaves
unanswered the question of how such materials are processed during normallanguage comprehension. We strongly feel that the existing evidence sug-
gests that more sensitive tasks-particularly those which do not cause con-
scious introspection about the stimulus materials in question-need to be
utilized in order to provide stable answers to these fundamental questions
underlying sentence comprehension. (For more detailed arguments and evi-
dence concerning methodology see: Nicol, Fodor, Swinney 1994; Fodor
1995; Nicol & Swinney 1989; Swinney 1981.)
There are a few studies that applied sensitive and non-consciously in-
trospective on-line paradigms to the examination of how idiomatic phrases
are processed during sentence comprehension (see, e.g., Cacciari & Tabossi
1988; Colombo 1993; 1998; Swinney 1981; Tabossi & Zardon 1993;
1995; Titone & Connine 1994). Most of these have used a cross-modal-
lexical-priming methodology (CMLP); Swinney, Onifer, Prather &
Hirshkowitz 1979; Swinney 1979; Swinney 1981) in which subjects listen-
ing to spoken sentences (or larger discourse units). The sentences contained
idioms, and at selected points while the idiom is being heard, a visual 'tar-
get' is displayed to which subjects make a binary decision (usually:
word/non-word decision task) or 'name' it as fast as possible. The visual
target is a word that is associatively related to either a part of the idiom
(e.g., a literal word occurring in the idiomatic word string) or to the figura-
tive meaning of the idiom overall. (Necessarily, the target may also be a
'control' word which is unrelated to any part of the idiom, but matches to
the 'associated' word on all other grounds-a priori (isolated) reaction time,
frequency, concreteness, category, etc.; if the task involves a lexical deci-
sion, a non-word letter string may be displayed; see for related issues Bor-
sky & Shapiro 1998; Hillert 1997). Decision reaction times to 'classify'
the visual target (word/non-word) or 'name' the visual target are recorded.
When priming (speeded responses to the associated word vs. the control
word) is found, it is taken as evidence that the 'associated material' in the
idiom has been accessed and is available to 'prime' the decision made to the
target word. Such priming, where found, constitutes prima facia evidence
for access and activation of various aspects of the phrase comprising the
idiom in the sentence. Even with use of these techniques, however, there is
disagreement over the nature of the process by which idioms are compre-
hended.
Swinney (1981) for example, used the CMLP paradigm to examine ac-
cess to idiomatic meanings in sentence contexts, probing at the offset of the
first word and last word of a 'grammatical idiomatic phrase' (one with both
literal and idiomatic interpretations) that occurred in the middle of a sen-
tence. Consider, for example, the phrase "kick the bucket". Swinney found
that target words related to the literal meaning of the first word ("kick")
were primed at the offset of that word but not at the offset of the last word
in the idiom ("bucket"). Further, he found priming for the overall idiomatic
meaning ("die") at the offset of the idiom phrase (at "bucket"), but not at
the offset of "kick". It was argued from this that literal meanings of idioms
are always accessed along with idiomatic meanings (at least for 'grammati-
cal' idioms). This evidence was also argued to demonstrate that the cohort
model of lexical access proposed by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1976) is
not, at the least, comprehensive, in that it does not accurately describe ac-
cess to lexicalized idiom meanings. (Under the cohort model the entire
idiomatic word meaning ("die") should have been accessed from the initial
consonant-vowel cluster of "/ki.../" (in "kick").)
In fact, Titone and Connine (1994) interpreted the above finding as
evidence against the LRH for idioms because of the failure to find priming
for the idiom meaning at the offset of the first word of the idiom phrase.
Their reasoning however, hinges on a belief that the cohort model of lexical
access is correct (namely, that all meanings for all words having an initial
consonant-vowel cluster will be accessed when that cluster is heard), a pre-
diction that has not been universally supported in the literature for simple
words, much less for multi-segmental words such as idioms. In fact, the
Swinney (1981) evidence stands against the cohort model as an overall ac-
count of lexical access. The issue here really is one of what constitutes the
basis for lexical access-the first consonant cluster, the initial syllable (e.g.,
Foss and Swinney 1973) the first stressed syllable (e.g., Cutler & Norris
1988), the entire form of the word (Swinney 1981), or the basic ortho-
graphic syllable (Taft and Forster 1975). The answer is simply not defini-
tively known at this time. Certainly, however, the Swinney data do not in
any way stand against the notion that idioms are stored and accessed as
words from the lexicon; the data, however, do not tell precisely how lexical
access takes place, and thus do not directly support the LRH (see, however,
work by Swinney & Cutler 1979). The data do suggest that, at least for
grammatical idioms, a literal analysis is attempted along with whatever
constitutes idiomatic processing.
Cacciari and Tabossi (1988; see also Cacciari & Glucksberg 1991; Ti-
tone & Connine 1994) have proposed a "configuration model" of idiom
processing, which holds that idiom meaning is not a separate lexical entry
but is meaning 'associated with a particular configuration of the words', a
meaning which is accessed only when the perceiver encounters an "idiom
key" in a phrase. An idiom key is a portion of an idiom that allows access
to this idiomatic meaning. Consider, for example, the idiom "kick the
bucket" The idiom interpretation of this phrase is more frequent than that
for its literal counterpart, and thus, it is argued that hearing the initial part
of the phrase ("kick the..." ) will more likely lead to an association and
completion with the word "bucket" than (for example) with the word
"ball". This idiom key / configuration model is clearly a type of literal-
meaning-dependent model, but one which holds as a central tenant the as-
sumption that language processing takes place via use of associative predic-
tion.
Cacciari and Tabossi (1988), for example, used a modified CMP (cross
modal priming) task to examine online access to predictable idiomatic
112 / DIETER HILLERT AND DAVID SWINNEY                                                                                                                                                                                                                       PROCESSING OF FIXED EXPRESSIONS / 113114 / DIETER HILLERT AND DAVID SWINNEY
phrases in Italian. "Predictable" in this case means that the first words of
the idiom indicate/suggest the figurative meaning. In an initial study, they
probed for activation of words related to the idiomatic and literal meaning
of the idiom at the offset of the idiomatic phrase (PP, probe point; e.g., "Il
ragazzo pensava the suo fratello fosse nato con la camicia." APP; gloss:
"The boy believed that his brother was born with the shirt"; tr. "The boy
believed that his brother was born with a silver spoon in his mouth"). Cac-
ciari and Tabossi reported that they found priming only for the idiomatic
meaning but not for the literal meaning at the end of sentence probe point.
In interpreting these data, we want to emphasize that the test point in this
study was at the end of the sentence/trial, a point that is usually avoided in
most CMP studies precisely because of sentential/trial 'wrap-up', 'reconsid-
eration' and 'conscious interpretation' effects that come in at this point.
(See e.g., discussions in Hillert & Swinney 2000; Swinney 1981; Swin-
ney, Nicol, Love, & Hald 1999; Balogh, Zurif, Prather, Swinney, & Finkel
1998 on many of these issues). Overall, ignoring any other experimentally-
related concerns, we note that the effect of priming between literal and con-
trol probes reached a significance level of p <.08, but the possibility of a
Type II error cannot be discounted. Thus, although it stands against 'con-
figurational' hypothesis, it appears that the literal meanings are likely acti-
vated in these material conditions, thus supporting the LRH. In a second
study involving low-predictable idioms Cacciari and Tabossi report signifi-
cant priming only for the literal meaning of the idiom, although, again, a
strong trend (p <.09) for significance of the idiomatic meaning was effec-
tively discounted. Prudence suggests that such a strong trend should not be
dismissed lightly. A third study which had a 300 ms delay between offset
of the idiom and the probe found priming for both literal and idiomatic
meanings. Thus, it appears that all meanings of the idioms-literal or figu-
rative-were eventually accessed in these studies, thus supporting a multi-
ple-access hypothesis in some form (e.g., LRH). The question remains,
however, as to the precise time course of the availability of each of the lit-
eral and idiomatic interpretations during sentence comprehension.
In addition to the lack of robust evidence about the nature of the opera-
tions involved in the processing of idioms, a number of important overarch-
ing issues remain that are of concern. For example, the existing studies of
sensitive, on-line examinations of idiom processing have all taken place
only on a limited number of languages. For example, English and Italian
are hardly representative of the range of language structures and processes
that a universal theory of figurative language (even fixed figurative lan-
guage) processing needs to consider. Further, the range of idiomatic struc-
tures that have been examined is extremely limited-limited enough that
significant generalizations may easily be missed, even if all of the data
would be in agreement. In what follows, we describe new evidence that is
intended to move in a direction to correct these holes in the empirical litera-
ture.
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3. On-line Examination of Idiom Compounds in German
Languages significantly differ with respect to the degree of lexical composi-
tion. For example, English and Chinese prefer single words to compounded
words while German tends to use (and create) compounds of great length
and complexity with high frequency. Although in Standard European Lan-
guages (SEL) 80-90 percent of nominal compounds contain only two-
elements, German has a relatively high percentage of compounds that con-
sist of more than two elements. For example, the complex compound
"Tonnentaschenfederkernmatratzenladenverkaufspreis" (discovered in a Ger-
man furniture store) can be relatively easily parsed by a native speaker. The
individual parts of this compound are: Tonnen-taschen-feder-kern-matratzen-
laden-verkaufs-preis;  gloss:  Tons-bags-feather-pit-mattress-shop-selling-
price). At least in SEL it is a general rule that the second element of a
nominal compound (head) dominates the first element (as it typically does
in English, e.g., "shrimpboat" is a type of boat). In the German example
"Bienenhonig" (bee-honey) the second element "-honig" can be analyzed as
the head and the first element "Biene-" as the modifier/subject (honey pro-
duced by bees); conversely, in "Honigbiene" (honey-bee) the second element
"-biene" is the head and the first element "Honig-" is the descriptor/modifier
(bees of a type that produce honey). Sometimes adult speakers actively
use/create novel compounds in a metaphoric sense and apply a 'literal'
compositional strategy (e.g., "Peter sucht sich Wortblumen fur den StrauB
seiner Rede"; gloss: Peter is looking for word-flowers for the bouquet of his
speech). Similarly, children often create new words to describe an object for
which they have not yet acquired an existing word (e.g., "Wolkenwasser"
(clouds-water) instead of "Regen" (rain)), and second language speakers ac-
tively (de)compose foreign words to create (understand) new meanings
which results sometimes in funny constructions (e.g., "cloud scraper"
(German: "Wolkenkratzer") instead of "sky scraper").
Again, a very large number of compounds with idiomatic meanings ex-
ist in German. For these, a speaker typically cannot apply a decomposi-
tional strategy to understand the idiomatic meaning. As with most phrasal
idioms some idiomatic compounds assign only an idiomatic meaning but
no literal meaning. For example, "Lampenfreber"   (gloss:   lamp-fever;
"stage-fright") has no literal counterpart. However, "Eselsohren" (literal:
"donkey's ears"; idiomatic: "dog's ear") does have a literal counterpart
("donkey's ears" are real things). The range of idiom compounds is enor-
mous-and they represent a particularly vexing problem for models of lan-
guage processing in a highly compound-productive language such as Ger-
man to account for. It is precisely in this domain, however, that we feel we
can most profitably examine the time course and nature of idiom process-
ing.
The initial work we report here examines the LRH by measuring the
time course of access to the literal and idiomatic meaning of German nomi-
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For example, in (2) we probed for the activation of the idiomatic meaning
(related: EITEL/vain; control: BUNT/colorful) and for the activation of the
literal   meaning  of  the  head  noun  (related:   BAUM/tree;  control:
SAMT/velvet) at the offset of the idiom compound. As in the previous
study, this experiment was designed so that no subject hears/sees more than
one probe/experimental word with any exemplar sentence. The mean reac-
tion times of fifty native German speakers to the idiomatic meaning and to
the literal meaning of the compounds' head in the neutral context condition
can be seen in Table 2. We found significant priming for idiomatic (p
<.0001) and literal (p <.05) interpretations in the neutral context with these
'idiom-only-interpretation' compounds. These results seem to strongly
support the interpretation that the literal meaning of the head noun of these
exclusively idiomatic compounds was accessed when the idiom was heard.
This was so in spite of the fact that there was no possible literal interpreta-
tion for this compound. These data argue therefore strongly for the LRH, at
least in the processing of German compounds.
Table 2.  Priming patterns (mean difference of reaction time to control-related probes) for
exclusively idiomatic compounds in a neutral sentence context.
Idiomatic Meaning
	
70 ms
Literal Meaning
	
67 ms
The outcome of both experiments together demonstrate that both idiomatic
meaning and literal meanings of words comprising idiom compounds in
German appear to be immediately activated when the idiom is heard during
sentence comprehension. This strongly suggests that fixed meaning phrases
act in much the same way as do lexical ambiguities-all meanings associ-
ated with the form of the word(s) are accessed automatically and exhaus-
tively.
4.   Conclusions
The research presented here, combined with prior work in the literature,
suggests strongly that fixed form expressions are processed in a manner
consistent with the literal-meaning-independent general models of idiom
processing. Moreover, they support a 'multiple-form-driven-access' version
of such models (all meanings-both idiom and literal-are accessed). The
evidence we present does not demonstrate any particular support for an id-
iom key or configurational role in such access, and it is completely consis-
tent with an account that holds that fixed idiomatic meanings are lexically
stored (LRH). The current evidence provides no basis for speculation about
a (de)compositional procedure involved in such access, but we note that we
only examined one particular idiom type in our work-compounds). Fi-
nally, there is no evidence in our work supportive of an anticipatory-
predictive process in the comprehension of idiom strings (such a process
would have allowed only the idiomatic interpretation to be accessed in a
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digm was employed throughout. In an initial study, we examined ambigu-
ous compounds (compounds with both a literal and an idiomatic interpreta-
tion) such as "Bienenstich" (literal: "bee-sting"; idiomatic meaning: "a par-
ticular cake") in a sentence context biased toward the idiomatic interpreta-
tion, as shown in (1).
(1)      Zu Weihnachten backte die Mutter stets einen Bienenstich ^ PP and
einen Stollen.
(At Christmas baked the Mother always a "bee-sting" and a fruit
loaf.)
Probe words related to the idiomatic meaning of the compound (related:
KUCHEN/cake; control: KANZEL/pulpit) and to the literal meaning of the
compound's head (related: HONIG/honey; control: ANKER/anchor) ap-
peared at the offset of the idiomatic compound in the figuratively biased
sentence.
2 Mean reaction times for 50 native (German) speakers (who saw
only a single probe with the sentence for each exemplar) can be seen in Ta-
ble 1. The priming effect for both the idiomatic-related target (p <.01) and
the literal-related target (p <.01) strongly support the argument that both the
literal and idiomatic interpretations of these ambiguous idioms were ac-
cessed in this study, even in the presence of a context biased only toward
the (more frequent) idiomatic interpretation.
Table 1. Priming patterns (mean difference of reaction time to control-related probes) of
ambiguous idiomatic compounds in figuratively biased sentence contexts.
Idiomatic Meaning
	
87 ms
Literal Meaning
	
48 ms
A second study, which used the same procedures and methods as the first
experiment, was run to examine a dramatically stronger case-that of the
processing of idiomatic compounds which only have idiomatic interpreta-
tions (idioms without literal interpretation) such as "Lackaffe" (gloss:   'lac-
monkey' ; someone who shows off). These idioms have fixed meanings and
are frequently used in everyday German conversation. In this study, such
idiomatic compounds were presented in a neutral sentence context.
(2)      Hans war nach der Ansicht der meisten Mitschuler ein Lackaffe ^PP
im aus gesprochenen Sinne.
(Hans was after the view of the most class mates a "lac-monkey" in a
decisive sense.)
2 We used a display time of 300 ms, a zero interstimulus-interval (0-ISI) and an intertrial -
interval of 2000 ms). Because of space limitations, we discuss in the present context only a
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figuratively biased sentence context). The present work supports the LHR,
that is, lexical access (whether of 'literal' or fixed `idiomatic' meanings) is a
strictly form-driven process.
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